





Beijing to Taipei, via Singapore








Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 March 2016




Stéphane Corcuff, « Beijing to Taipei, via Singapore », China Perspectives [Online], 2016/1 | 2016, Online
since 01 March 2016, connection on 15 September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
chinaperspectives/6925 
© All rights reserved
The announcement of the summit held between the Chinese and Tai-wanese Presidents on 7 November 2015 in Singapore had the effectof a thunderclap in Taipei, such was the surprise at the lack of prior
information provided by the authorities on both shores. (1) Various causes
have been advanced for the holding of the summit, an idea that has been
discussed for 20 years, but which had never taken place due to the many
obstacles to its organisation on both sides. 
Several explanations have been put forward in the public debate in Taiwan:
the desire of Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan's outgoing president, to carve out for
himself a place in history; the two presidents’ objective of restricting the
future policy of the favourite in the polls, the president of the main oppo-
sition party, Tsai Ing-wen; the determination of the Chinese President, Xi
Jinping, to make progress on the Taiwan issue; or the development of a com-
mon All-China front against Washington on the issue of the South China
Sea.
In this article, we focus on yet another cause that has been put forward,
which doesn’t exclude the others. It is China’s desire to intervene indirectly
in Taiwan’s then on-going campaign for the presidential and legislative elec-
tions of 16 January 2016, the outcome of which, a double defeat of the
Kuomintang (KMT), was by then no longer in doubt. This explanation does
not conflict with the tendency to see the two parties, the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP) and the KMT, as determined to take a step forward before
the return of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to power. We examine
here the hypothesis, advanced by many, that the Beijing authorities may
have eventually agreed to the organisation of the summit in order to bolster
Xi Jinping’s image in China on the Taiwan issue and try to influence a critical
situation for China in the Strait (the prospect of a historic defeat of the
KMT, a circumstantial ally of the CCP and a unifying party, which during the
eight-year presidency of Ma Ying-jeou had conducted a conciliatory policy
towards China). (2)
In the absence of testimony from those directly involved in the negotia-
tion regarding the motives of the two presidents, we simply suggest here
that it was China's concerns about the predicted return of the Democratic
Progressive Party to the presidency of the Republic and its probable victory
in the legislature, and the context of an irrepressible strengthening of the
island identity in attitudes in Taiwan, that led China to overcome its reluc-
tance to organise a summit that presented uncertain benefits and definite
disadvantages.
However, we focus less on the hypothesis of a cost-benefit analysis that
may have pushed Beijing to overlook the costs in order to obtain the ben-
efits, than more specifically on the use of an emergency wild card. According
to this interpretation, Beijing may have made  a kind of “hail Mary pass,”
hoping that this indirect intervention would positively influence the KMT’s
campaign without the inevitably negative impacts for China of such a sum-
mit proving disastrous for its Taiwan policy in the world, without, however,
being too confident of its chance of success. It appears that not only did
the intervention not benefit the KMT electorally, but also that the interna-
tional benefits derived by Taiwan from such a summit proved to be real,
demonstrating that China cannot control the Taiwanese game: neither the
carrot nor the stick seem to have any effect in the face of the affirmation
of a Taiwanese nation. China knew it for sure, but could Beijing afford to
stand still?
After first recalling the origin of the idea of  a summit between the two
presidents and the failure of governments on both shores to organise it pre-
viously, we briefly examine a few causes that have been put forward to ex-
plain its suddenly being held, prior to finding that only a critical situation
could have led Beijing to give the summit a try when it presented so many
disadvantages for China.
The meeting: An old idea
In January 1995, in a speech on Taiwan policy in eight points (Jiang badian
江八點), Chinese President Jiang Zemin discussed the possibility of the lead-
ers of both sides meeting, suggesting a willingness to discuss the status
under which they could meet. As Jean-Pierre Cabestan analysed it then,
Jiang’s openings were nevertheless all relative and remained constrained by
the rigid framework of a People's Republic that refused to recognise the ex-
istence and sovereignty of the Republic of China. (3)
Since then, no summit had been organised. Any discussion was indeed
stalled by China’s refusal to invite the Taiwanese leader in his capacity as
President of the Republic of China, its reluctance to organise the meeting
in a third country, and Taiwan’s refusal to send its President to the territory
of the so-called “continental” China unless he was recognised as head of
state. In addition, several political events in the 1990s and 2000s made the
prospect of a meeting more remote: Lee Teng-hui’s long considered and un-
compromising response to the “Eight Points”; his visit to the United States
a few months later, which triggered Chinese anger and the 1995-1996 mis-
sile crisis; finally the election in 2000 of Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, who
opposed unification: all these events caused China’s position to be even
more uncompromising, which was especially palpable during the end of
Lee’s tenure and during the two mandates of Chen Shui-bian. The presidency
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of Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016), which saw the return to power of the signif-
icantly more pro-unification Kuomintang, certainly led to a modest im-
provement in relations, but not to any change on the core issue of
sovereignty, while the prospect of unification appeared ever more remote.
Thus the current Chinese President Xi Jinping declared in October 2013,
shortly after his accession as head of state, that reunification with Taiwan
“could not be perpetually put off from generation to generation” (buneng
yidai yidai chuan xiaqu), (4) causing a wave of questions about his intentions,
which have not been very explicit in this regard, particularly as to how he
would go about solving a problem for which none of his predecessors had
been able to find a solution. However, while brandishing a verbal threat, he
also announced that he supported the meeting of the “heads of institutions
of both parties” (shuangfang zhuguan bumen fuzeren) to “conduct negoti-
ations on an equal footing with Taiwan” (tong Taiwan jinxing pingdeng
xieshang). (5)
Did he already mean by this that it was possible to take another look at
the matter of a meeting between the presidents, echoing the eighth point
set out by Jiang Zemin 18 years earlier? The careful wording of Xi Jinping
at the time made it impossible to know for sure, but the organisation of the
summit two years later appears to confirm that he favoured it, or at least
that he had come around to the idea. Why was the summit finally organ-
ised? There are probably several reasons, and testimonies and revelations
that may be published in the future will help us to sharpen the analysis.
The reasons put forward
First of all, one might be tempted to see Xi Jinping, involved on many do-
mestic and international fronts, as seeking a breakthrough in the difficult
Taiwanese question at a time when the growth of the Chinese economy is
slowing down. The situation in the Strait might have seemed propitious:
Ma’s two terms of office were those of a relative relaxation in the Strait,
and meeting the leader of the KMT, a party that is both brother and enemy,
at a time of reconciliation might enhance Xi Jinping’s stature. This is one of
the causes put forward by The Economist. (6) But then why do it so late,
when Ma Ying-jeou had made no secret at several points during his two
terms of his willingness to meet with his counterparts Hu Jintao and Xi Jin-
ping? It seems that the tardiness of the summit and its organisation seven
months before the end of Ma’s mandate at least partially discredit this ar-
gument, unless it is taken into consideration along with other explanatory
causes.
In Taiwan, many Internet users interpreted the repeated efforts of the Tai-
wanese President in view of the summit as an attempt to carve for himself,
by means of this meeting, a historic stature that would distract from the
unfavourable image left by his two terms as head of state: his economic
and social record is heavily criticised in Taiwan, and his approval ratings
never exceeded 20% during the last three years of his term. (7) However,
this is a political argument related to party politics, and the fact that it is
widespread in Taiwan does not make it indisputable, even though such an
explanation is as difficult to disprove as it is to confirm.
Some have seen the Singapore meeting as a strategy by Beijing to try to
make an ally of Taipei (or more precisely, the KMT) in an All-China nation-
alist front facing the United States on the sensitive issue of sovereignty in
the South China Sea, where Taiwan maintains a territorial claim in the name
of its regime identity as the Republic of China. (8) But again, this argument
is not entirely convincing. Five weeks after the summit, and three weeks
before the Taiwan elections of 16 January, US Congress decided to allow the
Obama administration to make its third and final sale of weapons and major
military equipment to Taiwan. Since such a sale could not take place before
the end of Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, and while the coming electoral defeat
of the KMT was already almost certain at the time of the announcement,
we may conjecture that the United States did not see in this summit a risk
of an anti-US united front in the South China Sea, confirming the officially
positive take on the summit indicated by the White House spokesman three
days before the meeting. (9) The surprise created by Ma Ying-jeou’s visit to
the island of Itu Aba on 28 January did lead observers to wonder again about
the possibility that the two presidents discussed the issue during the sum-
mit, yet it is unclear that this visit was anything more than a simple reaf-
firmation of sovereignty by an outgoing president, just as his predecessor,
who belonged to the DPP, had done just before leaving office in February
2008.
Shared and diverging interests
In the aggregation of causes that led to the decision to hold an interna-
tional meeting between two parties, neither of which has established ab-
solute control over the destiny of the other, at least two configurations
leading to the decision can be considered. The first is where respective in-
terests diverge, which led the two parties to discuss their goals in order to
seek a minimum consensus; the second is where interests converged at the
outset on one or more points, and the existence of a minimum initial con-
sensus that allowed the meeting to result in political decisions.
Yet, this is in fact ideal-types. The Economist, in its analysis of the summit,
adopted that one clear distinction by opposing the two parties’ interests,
and concluded that with the two interpretations completely opposed to
each other, “They cannot both be right.” (10) Yet the distinction between
these two types of situations is, in fact, rarely that clear, as it only requires
the two parties to be willing to reach a minimal agreement between their
diverging interests for them to find a consensus to start with. This was the
case in Singapore.
It is true that Chinese and Taiwanese interests on both shores are di-
vergent: while the People’s Republic of China wants reunification and the
end of the legal existence of the Republic of China, the latter seeks to
ensure its international survival, and to protect itself from the irredentist
aims of its neighbour. However, when the KMT was in power, Taiwan’s
policies converged with China’s on the ultimate goal of reunification,
based on the belief that Taiwan and China belong to the same nation, a
point that Ma and Xi restated clearly in Singapore, only to see Taiwan’s
pro-independence camp strongly resenting it. Did a particular congrega-
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tion of interests, a unique event, or a particular context finally make  the
summit possible?
Two decades ago, in his analysis of Jiang Zemin’s “Eight Points” published
in Perspectives chinoises, Jean-Pierre Cabestan spelled out in the following
terms the interest of such a meeting for both parties, while indicating that
the obstacles were numerous: “In this way, the Taipei government could
hope, in any event, to enhance its international stature, and Beijing would
be able to consider opening real political negotiations.” (11)
After 20 years, during which the situation in the Strait has changed con-
siderably, especially because of internal political developments in Taiwan, is
this framework still valid? It is clear that for China, the prospect of opening
political negotiations with Taiwan has become more remote, while through
the meeting between the two presidents in Singapore, Taiwan was effectively
able to gain international visibility. The Taiwanese president in fact appeared
before a large audience of international journalists who addressed him as
“Mr. President” or “President Ma,” which had never happened before.
A critical electoral situation
Given that the Taiwanese president was in no position to conduct secret
negotiations with Beijing (which would have undermined the sovereignty
of the regime over which he presided) and that the summit was likely to
turn to the media advantage of Taiwan, which was presented as seeking
peace, what could be China's interest in agreeing to the Xi-Ma meeting
seven months from the end of Ma’s mandate?
The proximity between the summit in early November 2015, the Tai-
wanese elections in January 2016, the subsequent inauguration of new
members of the legislature (1 February), and the inauguration of the new
president (20 May) cannot fail to raise the question of a possible connection
between the meeting, the Taiwanese electoral calendar, and the perspective
of a major change in the political and geopolitical situation in Taiwan, and
possibly in the Strait.
To speak only of the presidential election, the KMT candidate Hung Hsiu-
chu, who was replaced shortly before the summit in Singapore, had for sev-
eral months been constantly predicted as heading for defeat, with between
12.7% and 20.5% support in the polls, (12) always trailing far behind Tsai Ing-
wen. Her replacement at the end of October by KMT chairman Chu Li-lun
had no effect on the poll results. The elections to the chamber – the Leg-
islative Yuan – also threatened the imminent loss by the KMT of the ab-
solute majority it has held ever since the legislative election of 1947.
If such a prospect was enough to be a source of anxiety for China, the sum-
mit can be interpreted as the result of the perception by both parties of an
exceptional situation playing against their interests and the desire of both
presidents to make a strong symbolic step forward before a DPP government
come into office. Moreover, this was based on an initial consensus between
the two parties: Taiwan’s belonging, according to the KMT, to the Chinese
nation, as expressed in the agreement of the Party to the “1992 Consensus,”
the interpretation that the KMT and the CCP gave to the meeting of their
delegates in Singapore in 1992, and based on the principle that there is only
“one China” (yige Zhongguo 一個中國). Furthermore, it is likely to be a cal-
culation, rather than an oversight, which would explain why Ma Ying-jeou,
to the great displeasure of the Taiwanese, did not mention before Xi Jinping
the further interpretation of the “1992 Consensus,” which the KMT has pro-
moted, but which irritates the People's Republic: “One China,” yes, but with
“respective interpretations” (gezi biaoshu 各自表述). We could see in this
the results of the respective interests of each party, and their common in-
terest in unification, the decision by Ma Ying-jeou not to offend Xi Jinping,
and perhaps also a prior request from the Chinese side during the negotia-
tions to organise the summit for Ma to stick to the Beijing position.
A summit without major follow-up
Can policy decisions taken in the area of their mutual relations by the
parties to the Singapore summit and announced after the event confirm
the hypothesis of a link between the summit, the pre-election situation of
the KMT, and China's concerns about the unknown post-KMT in Taiwan,
while at the same time providing information about the content of the ne-
gotiations behind closed doors?
Two decisions establishing closer links in the Strait and announced shortly
before the election may possibly lead one to believe so: the establishment
of a hotline between the two governments announced on 30 December; (13)
and the first authorisations, previously denied by Beijing, for Chinese tourists
to transit through Taiwan en route to third countries, on 6 January. (14) The
Presidency in Taipei did not fail to see these as the result of “relaxation” and
a direct consequence of the Singapore summit – going so far as to credit
the latter, in its enthusiasm, for a release of spies that had apparently taken
place three weeks before the summit itself. (15) The fact that, according to
the Taiwanese press, the hotline appears to have been shut down by the
Chinese side after the DPP victory would tend to confirm that China was
merely seeking to influence the vote, (16) while closing it would not be a pos-
itive sign from Beijing’s side.
If all this was an attempt to influence Taiwan's elections, it would be wrong
to see it as effective. The meeting in Singapore had already provoked sharp
criticism in Taiwan against Ma Ying-jeou, especially for his “culpable neglect”
before Xi Jinping on the “1992 Consensus,” so that the summit had increased
concern in a majority of Taiwanese about their president’s China policy. (17)
Surveys conducted immediately after the summit also showed that the
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meeting had not benefited the KMT presidential candidate, Chu Li-lun, and
on the contrary, had slightly increased support for the DPP candidate. As for
its influence on the election itself, on 16 January, the two events were too
distant at the time of the vote, and the electoral debate too focused on re-
form in Taiwan, to prejudge any significant impact on the election itself. (18)
Conclusion
While the Ma Ying-jeou government insisted on showing that China was
moving forward following the summit, it is actually rather by its discretion
that China seems to shine in its attempt, if any, to influence the election,
at least in comparison with the missile crisis that preceded the 1996 elec-
tion, and the suspicions of Chinese pressure on major Taiwanese business-
men who had publicly opposed Tsai's candidacy in 2012. Everything seems
to indicate that China had also understood the final outcome and the dan-
ger of a too visible response. Beijing did resume, as in 2012, the principle of
indirectly subsidising – through associations of Taiwanese businessmen in
China – plane tickets for Taishang (19) to return to Taiwan to vote, which by
the way led an authoritarian regime to subsidise a democratic election in
order to try to influence it. Yet, this was done without much enthusiasm
and relatively discreetly. (20) As for the few major Taiwanese business leaders
who had publicly taken sides in 2012 through statements to the media and
advertising inserts in the press, this time all refrained from public interven-
tion, a sign of China’s very narrow margin of manoeuvre on this issue, unless
it were to resort to an expensive and risky military intervention.
z Translated by Michael Black.
z Stéphane Corcuff is director of the CEFC branch in Taipei. 
Room B110, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences,
Academia Sinica, Taipei 11529, Taiwan (scorcuff@cefc.com.hk).
58 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 6 / 1
18. Stéphane Corcuff, “Chine-Taiwan : après Singapour” (China-Taiwan: After Singapore), Asialyst, 25
November 2015, https://asialyst.com/fr/2015/11/25/chine-taiwan-apres-singapour (accessed on
27 January 2016).
19. On the notion of Taishang, cf. the article by Gunter Schubert, Lin Rui-hua, and Tseng Yu-Chen in
this issue of China Perspectives (pp. 29-36).
20. There was little comment in the media and on social networks about the question, which was
noted by observers. It seems that the amount of the subsidy provided to businessmen who wished
to go home to vote was considerably reduced this time around. Cf. “Zhe yi ci, haiyou duoshao
dalu Taishang hui Tai toupiao?” (This Time Around, How Many Taishang Will Go Home to Taiwan
to Vote?), The Initium, 31 January 2015, https://theinitium.com/article/20151231-taiwan-pres-
idential-election-taiwan-businessmen (accessed on 27 January 2016).
Current affairs
